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1. [Kerry, Hagel Discuss National Security in Pentagon Meeting](#) (05-06-2013)

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 6, 2013 – Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hosted Secretary of State John F. Kerry at the Pentagon today for a working lunch to discuss a range of national security issues, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little said.

This was the first meeting of the two secretaries at the Pentagon since they both took their respective offices earlier this year, Little said in a statement issued after the meeting.

Hagel presented Kerry with a print of a painting from the Navy's art collection titled "Showing the Flag in Ca Mau (PT-71)" by Gerland Merfeld, Little said. "Mr. Merfeld made this painting in 1969 while an embedded illustrator with the U.S. Navy," he added. "It depicts two Navy patrol craft boats on the Mekong River delta in the far south of Vietnam."

Hagel presented the painting to remember and honor Kerry's service to the Defense Department of Defense and the nation, Little said, noting that this is the first time that both the sitting secretary of state and secretary of defense are Vietnam War combat veterans.

The original painting is part of the Navy's permanent collection. It is on exhibition at the Navy Museum here and will be transferred to the State Department for viewing throughout Kerry's tenure, Little said.

Hagel was grateful to receive a signed photograph from Kerry taken during their February 2008 congressional delegation visit to Afghanistan along with Vice President Joe Biden, who then was a U.S. senator, he added.

Biographies:

[John F. Kerry](#)

[Chuck Hagel](#)

2. NATO Secretary General Warns Europe on Defense Cuts (05-06-2013)

By Nick Simeone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 6, 2013 – NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned today that further cuts in defense spending by European nations risk reducing the continent's defense and security to "hot air," turning the alliance into what he called a "global spectator" rather than a real force on the world stage.

"The only way to avoid this is by holding the line on defense spending and to start reinvesting in security as soon as our economies recover," he told a meeting in Brussels of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Rasmussen said European nations should not become absorbed by their own domestic issues, including sluggish economies that have contributed to defense cuts, and instead develop a "truly global perspective" to respond to crises further away from home.

"Having the right capabilities is important, but it is not enough," he said. "We must also have the political will to use them, to deal with security challenges on Europe's doorstep, to help manage crises further away that might affect us here at home, and to better share the security burden with our North American allies."

Meanwhile, he said, European nations need to make better use of what they have – "to do more together as Europeans – within the European Union and within NATO - to deliver the critical defense capabilities that are too expensive for any individual country to deliver alone."

It was the latest in a series of warnings over the past several years by Rasmussen that further cuts by European governments in defense spending could put NATO's viability at risk. In 2011, Rasmussen said the trend suggested the continent was headed toward getting out of the security business entirely, pointing out that European nations had cut their defense budgets by \$45 billion - the equivalent of Germany's entire annual defense budget - while U.S. contributions to NATO had increased from about half of total alliance spending to close to 75 percent.

Those comments were followed by a blunt warning from then-U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who said NATO risked "irrelevance" and a "dismal future" if alliance members were not seen as "serious and capable partners in their own defense."

Today, Rasmussen said soft power alone really is no power at all.

“Without hard capabilities to back up its diplomacy, Europe will lack credibility and influence,” he added. “It will risk being a global spectator, rather than the powerful global actor that it can be and should be.”

Biographies:

[Anders Fogh Rasmussen](#)

Related Sites:

[NATO](#)

3. DOD Report on China Details Military Modernization (05-06-2013)

By Karen Parrish

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 6, 2013 – A Defense Department report released today describes China’s military modernization and the Chinese army’s interaction with other forces, including those of the United States, a senior Pentagon official said today.

The annual report -- titled “2013 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” -- went to Congress today and covers China’s security and military strategies; developments in China’s military doctrine, force structure and advanced technologies; the security situation in the Taiwan strait; U.S.–China military-to-military contacts and the U.S. strategy for such engagement; and the nature of China’s cyber activities directed against the Defense Department.

David F. Helvey, deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, briefed Pentagon reporters on the report. He noted that the report, which DOD coordinates with other agencies, “reflects broadly the views held across the United States government.” The report is factual and not speculative, he noted.

Helvey said the trends in this year’s report show the rising power increasing its rapid military modernization program. “We see a good deal of continuity in terms of the modernization priorities,” Helvey noted, despite the 2012 and 2013 turnover to new leadership, which happens roughly every decade in China.

The report notes China launched its first aircraft carrier in 2012 and is sustaining investments in advanced short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons and military cyberspace systems.

Helvey noted these technologies all bolster China’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities.

“The issue here is not one particular weapons system,” he said. “It’s the integration and overlapping nature of these weapons systems into a regime that can potentially impede or restrict free military operations in the Western Pacific. So that’s something that we monitor and are concerned about.”

Helvey said the report provides a lot of information, but also raises some questions. “What concerns me is the extent to which China’s military modernization occurs in the absence of the kind of openness and transparency that others are certainly asking of China,” he added.

That lack of transparency, he noted, has effects on the security calculations of others in the region. “And so it's that uncertainty, I think, that's of greater concern,” he said.

Helvey added the report noted China has “increased assertiveness with respect to its maritime territorial claims” over the past year. China disputes sovereignty with Japan over islands in the East China Sea, and has other territorial disputes with regional neighbors in the South China Sea.

“With respect to these claims, we encourage all parties to the different disputes or interactions to address their issues peacefully, through diplomatic channels in a manner consistent with international law,” he said.

Helvey noted China’s relations with Taiwan have been consistent. “Over the past year, cross-strait relations have improved,” he said. “However, China's military buildup shows no signs of slowing.”

China also is building its space and cyberspace capabilities, Helvey said. He noted that in 2012, China conducted 18 space launches and expanded its space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological and communication satellite constellations.

“At the same time, China continues to invest in a multidimensional program to deny others access to and use of space,” Helvey said.

Addressing China’s cyber capabilities, Helvey said the Chinese army continues to develop doctrine, training and exercises that emphasize information technology and operations.

“In addition, in 2012, numerous computer systems around the world, including those owned by the United States government, continued to be targeted for intrusions, some of which appear to be attributable directly to Chinese government and military organizations,” he added.

Helvey noted a positive trend in U.S.-China engagements over the year, including several senior-leader visits culminating in then-Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s visit to Beijing in September.

The two sides also explored practical areas of cooperation, he said, including the first counterpiracy exercise conducted in September by Chinese and U.S. forces, followed by the U.S. invitation to China to participate in the Rim of the Pacific exercise in 2014.

“We'll continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to expand areas where we can cooperate, discuss, frankly, our differences, and demonstrate the United States' commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region,” Helvey said.

Biographies:

[David F. Helvey](#)

Related Sites:

[2013 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Transcript](#)

4. Deputy Secretary Burns on America and a Changing Middle East (05-06-2013)

Remarks by William J. Burns, Deputy Secretary of State, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

America and a Changing Middle East

Thank you, Dan. It's an honor to be back at Princeton, and back at the Woodrow Wilson School, an institution whose commitment to public service I have long admired. It's an honor to be among so many people whose service to our nation I respect so much -- from George Mitchell to Ryan Crocker. And it's a particular honor to be introduced by my friend, Dan Kurtzer. There is, quite simply, no better model of skill and professionalism and decency in American diplomacy than Dan.

I've been asked this morning to offer a few reflections on American policy across a Middle East in the midst of profound and turbulent change. I promise to be brief, which is probably a healthy instinct at this hour on a Saturday morning.

I wish I could also promise to be uplifting, but that's a little harder. The Middle East is a place where pessimists seldom lack for either company or validation, where skeptics hardly ever seem wrong. It is a place where American policymakers often learn humility the hard way ... a place where you can most easily see the wisdom in Winston Churchill's famous comment that what he liked most about Americans was that they usually did the right thing in the end; they just liked to exhaust all the alternatives first.

I've learned a few things about the Middle East during my own checkered thirty-one year career in the Foreign Service. I've learned that stability is not a static phenomenon, and that regimes which do not offer their citizens a sense of political dignity and economic possibility ultimately become brittle and break. I've learned that change in the Middle East is rarely neat or linear, but often messy and cruel, and deeply unpredictable in its second and third order consequences.

I've learned not to underestimate the depth of mistrust of American motives that animates so many people in the region, and I've learned that we often get far more credit than we deserve for complicated conspiracies. I've learned that, with all its stubborn dysfunction, the Middle East is a place where people and leaders are capable of great things ... and that American diplomacy, with all of our own occasional dysfunction, can make a real and enduring difference.

So let me first talk briefly about why the Middle East still matters in American foreign policy and how the Middle East is changing, and then outline several elements of a positive American policy agenda -- what we can do to help shape, within the limits of our influence, the great generational struggle between moderation and extremism that is unfolding across the Middle East today.

Why the Middle East Still Matters and How It Is Changing

After a post 9/11 decade dominated by two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it's not hard to see why Americans would seek to rebalance our priorities. We live in a rapidly changing world, in which American interests are pulled in many directions. I just returned from a long trip to Asia, and it's obvious that the Asia-Pacific region is not only the most dynamic part of the global economy in the new century which lies ahead, but also a logical centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. The transformation of the global energy market through the shale technology revolution is also affecting our views of the Middle East. With the U.S. likely to overtake Saudi Arabia as the world's leading oil producer in the next five years or so, and with the prospect of genuine energy independence in

the next twenty years or so, it's natural to wonder if we really need to pay so much attention to the Middle East. And it is a truism that American's chief foreign policy challenge is domestic renewal, strengthening our home-grown capacity to compete and promote our interests and values around the world.

Tempting though it may be, we do not have the luxury of pivoting away from the Middle East, which sometimes has a nasty way of reminding us of its relevance. We don't have the luxury of pivoting away from a part of the world that holds some of our closest allies, and a very sizeable chunk of the world's oil reserves, on which the global economy is still dependent even if we are headed towards self-sufficiency. And we don't have the luxury of pivoting away from a part of the world that holds several of the world's most poisonous regional conflicts, and violent extremists who feed on the region's bitterness and alienation.

We cannot, in short, afford to neglect what's at stake in a region going through its own awakening, at once promising and painful, and potentially every bit as consequential for international order as the changes which swept over Europe and Eurasia two decades ago.

It's important to understand that the Arab Awakening is about several layers of change -- within, among and beyond Arab states. Within a number of states, the spark produced by a desperate Tunisian vendor, tired of too many indignities and too many lost hopes, proved highly combustible. Within months of that tragic self-immolation, a half-century old political order collapsed in several Arab states, including Egypt, the biggest of all. Societies that for far too long had known far too little freedom, far too little opportunity and far too little dignity began to erupt. But what also spilled out, in addition to the thirst of individual citizens for dignity, were all the demons of sectarian and communal tension that authoritarian rulers had forcefully contained.

That dynamic in turn helped set off new uncertainties and frictions among states in the region, as sectarian troubles and old Sunni-Shia passions spilled across borders still not firmly rooted nearly a century after their post-World War One formation.

Meanwhile, beyond Arab states, violent extremist groups were quick to try to fill emerging vacuums and take advantage of post-revolutionary chaos. Non-Arab regional powers like Turkey, Israel and Iran loomed larger as traditional Arab powers like Egypt turned inward, and major external players like China and India grew even more reliant on access to regional energy supplies. And across this whole shifting landscape, the Arab Awakening stirred up familiar debates about the role of religion in politics, gender equality, individual human rights and globalization.

What all of these layers of change add up to is the most significant transition in the Arab world since the revolutions of the 1950's. And what they have laid bare is the long-term question of whether an "Arab center", as my friend and former Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher has described it, can eventually replace the old order ... gradually establishing democratic institutions to manage sectarian differences and provide an outlet for individual dignity ... or whether hardliners and extremists of one stripe or another will prove more resilient. The United States has a powerful stake in that very complex competition, and in shaping a careful, long-term strategy for enhancing the chances for a new, moderate order which best protects our interests and reflects our values.

Elements of a Positive American Agenda

If "rebalancing" has been a central feature of American foreign policy under President Obama more generally, it also applies in particular to how we're approaching a rapidly changing Middle East.

With the end of the war in Iraq, the U.S. military footprint in the region has become smaller, although it's obvious that our security commitments remain enormously important. Diplomatic and economic tools get greater emphasis, as does the value of applying American leadership to build partnerships with key players inside and outside the region to support positive changes. We need to convey a clear sense of what we stand for, not just what we stand against -- an agenda that offers a powerful antidote to extremists, who are much better at tearing things down than building anything up.

It seems to me that a workable, long-term American strategy has three inter-connected elements: support for democratic change, economic opportunity, and regional peace and security. All three are crucial to our broader goal of enhancing the chances that moderates will shape the new regional order more than extremists. All three require us to look carefully at where the United States can uniquely make a difference, and at how best to mobilize other countries, inside and outside the region, in common cause. And all three require us to find a sensible course between self-defeating inaction and unsustainable unilateralism. We also have to be honest with ourselves: there will inevitably be some tough tradeoffs among these priorities at different moments, and times when it will be hard to weigh the long-term benefits of pushing democratic reforms against short-term security demands. But all three elements have to frame our broader agenda. Let me touch quickly on each.

Democratic reform can proceed in different ways and at different paces in different places in the region, but there won't be a moderate outcome to the Arab Awakening over the next generation without it. Whether in countries in post-revolutionary transition, or countries trying to stay ahead of the wave of change through evolutionary reform, the United States consistently emphasizes a common set of principles: respect for the rule of law; peaceful and inclusive political processes; protecting the fundamental rights of all citizens -- including women and minorities and people of all faiths; and steady focus on building strong democratic institutions, real checks and balances, and vibrant civil societies.

We try to hold leaders and parties of every political shape to these standards. When it comes to building sustainable democracies, the most consequential distinction is not between Islamists and secularists, but between those who embrace pluralism based on rule of law, and those who seek to impose their own vision on others. All parties need to engage in the political process and not sit on the sidelines. Those in power have a special responsibility to make clear that force is no substitute for politics, and that a majority is no substitute for dialogue and consensus. And all must condemn and prevent violence, which truly poisons politics.

Whether in fragile, post-revolutionary states like Tunisia or Egypt ... or in monarchies trying to keep pace with their people's expectations, like Morocco or Jordan ... sustainable democratic change depends upon the full participation of all citizens in political and economic life; the belief of all citizens that their peacefully-expressed views are heard and respected; and the conviction of all citizens that they share a stake in their country's future.

No democratic transition can succeed without a sense of confidence in a better and more inclusive economic future. Unless the Arab Awakening is accompanied by an economic awakening, it will collapse. The hard truth is that most Arab societies have ducked serious economic reform for far too long; where economic liberalization has occurred, its benefits have often been limited to a privileged few. But serious reform cannot take place in a sustainable manner without basic political consensus on the rules of the game, lest it provoke chaos and instability. That's why inclusive politics and inclusive economic change have to go hand in hand, and why the long term goal should be societies in which getting ahead depends less on who you know and more on what you know.

There is much more that we and other outsiders can do to support long-term economic reform. Even more than conventional assistance, we can use the promise of market access and open trading arrangements to encourage reform and create jobs. We can use initiatives like the new Enterprise Funds in Egypt and Tunisia to support small and medium-sized enterprises. And we can invest even more actively in helping to renovate educational systems and promoting scholarships and exchanges, so that the next generation is better-equipped to compete and succeed. Those are some of the very best investments in a moderate future for the region that I can imagine.

Finally, just as sustainable democratic reform and economic opportunity depend on one another, both depend on a more stable regional environment. I hardly need to tell any of you how hard it will be to make progress on the deepening crisis in Syria, or the Iranian nuclear issue, or the long-stalled Israeli-Palestinian peace process. But these are areas in which American diplomacy and influence can make a difference, and in which we have a profound stake. Our interests and credibility are at risk on each of them. While I realize that there are lots of other significant security priorities for American policy -- from the continuing importance of Iraq's stable evolution, as Ryan Crocker has rightly emphasized recently, to getting ahead of growing terrorist threats in the Maghreb -- let me offer a few brief thoughts on Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli issue, and I'd be glad to address other challenges in our discussion.

The scale and scope of the human tragedy in Syria today is staggering, and it is inexorably becoming a regional tragedy. More than 70,000 Syrians have died. According to the United Nations, one out of three Syrians will have been forced from their homes by the end of 2013. Jordan is overwhelmed by the burden of 500,000 Syrian refugees -- a number which could reach a million by the end of the year. The crisis in Syria has spilled over to seriously inflame politics in Iraq and Lebanon. State structures in Syria are crumbling, extremists are expanding their influence among the opposition, and the dangers of long-term sectarian conflict and fragmentation are growing rapidly. Apparent use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime is deeply troubling, and we continue to press for a comprehensive UN investigation to fully establish the facts, as we consider our options for responding.

The simple truth is that there can be no stability in Syria, no resolution of the crisis, without a transition to new leadership. The longer Asad clings to power, the greater the odds of state implosion, fragmentation, and regional spillover. President Obama and Secretary Kerry have made clear that our strong preference remains a negotiated transition. The Geneva framework of last summer offers a reasonable starting point, but Asad refuses to engage. Russia has been resistant, to put it mildly, to using its leverage on the Asad regime; Secretary Kerry's visit to Moscow in a few days is an opportunity to test whether cooperation is possible.

We're working intensively with a range of partners to strengthen the Syrian opposition and help shift the balance on the ground, which is essential to any chance of shifting Asad's calculus. The Secretary announced last month that we've doubled non-lethal assistance to the opposition, and the Administration is actively considering our other options. There is a mounting urgency to this effort, as both the human and strategic costs grow.

I wish I could offer you a neat, new prescription this morning, but I cannot. All I can tell you is that we have to work even harder with our allies and the opposition to accelerate Asad's exit, while there's still a Syria left to save, and to prepare for what will inevitably be a very difficult day after -- more likely, very difficult years after.

Whatever decisions we make on further steps in Syria, it is crucial to mobilize as much regional and international support as we can -- leveraging our actions to help produce a stronger and more inclusive opposition coalition; and a stronger and more coordinated set of outside backers. That kind of "compact" has been the aim of Secretary Kerry's very energetic diplomatic efforts over recent weeks. If we've learned anything from the experience of the last decade, it's that on extraordinarily tough, complex Middle East problems like Syria, we want to build as much shared purpose and responsibility as we can -- we should want company on the take off, because we will all need it for the landing, in the huge challenge of post-Asad Syria.

On Iran, let me say simply that our concerns are profound, and they extend beyond the nuclear issue, across a range of dangerous Iranian behavior that threatens our interests and those of our friends in the region, and to the Iranian regime's denial of the human rights of its citizens. The President has emphasized since his first days in office our readiness, along with our P5+1 partners, to seek a negotiated resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem. That shouldn't be impossible -- if Iran is serious about meeting its international obligations and demonstrating through concrete steps the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear ambitions. Unfortunately, Iran has been stubbornly unwilling, so far, to seriously address international concerns, and has given rise to new ones with its steady, defiant expansion of its nuclear program, in direct violation of numerous UNSC resolutions and IAEA decisions. At recent meetings in Almaty, the P5+1 put a reasonable, reciprocal confidence building proposal on the table, aimed at beginning to create some sense of trust and allow time and space for negotiation of a more comprehensive arrangement. Unfortunately, Iran's response gave no indication that it is willing to take meaningful steps to address international concerns.

There is still time for diplomacy, and we and our partners hope Iran will take advantage of it. But there is also increasing urgency on this issue too. The President has made very clear that he will do whatever it takes to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. We and our partners have put in place an unprecedented set of sanctions, which has had a significant and growing impact on Iran's economy. I continue to hope that serious diplomacy is still possible; too many opportunities have been missed before, including the abortive fall 2009 deal on the Tehran Research Reactor, in which I played a direct part. It would be a huge miscalculation for Iran to miss this one too.

On the Palestinian issue, I'm convinced that the status quo between Palestinians and Israelis is as unsteady, unsustainable and combustible as the sclerotic political systems that have crumbled elsewhere in the region over the past couple years. I have never been a big believer in the notion that we have to let the conflict "ripen" to the point that resolution seems more likely. I'm afraid the more likely effect of that approach is to watch the prospects for a two-state solution -- which is so deeply in the interests of Israel's long-term security as well as the interests of the Palestinians and the region -- wither and die on the vine.

President Obama underscored in Jerusalem earlier this spring his belief that progress towards Middle East peace is necessary, just and possible. In only a few months in office, Secretary Kerry has been tireless in his efforts to find a path back to serious negotiations -- a path that blends a renewed political horizon for a two-state outcome, with steps to create an encouraging economic horizon for Palestinians, and a renewed focus on the decade-old promise of the Arab Peace Initiative, which the Secretary discussed with a visiting group of Arab foreign ministers last Monday.

None of this will be easy. It never has been. Former Secretary of State Jim Baker, a proud Princeton graduate, keeps a whole wall of caustic newspaper cartoons outside his office in Houston, which reflected the skepticism surrounding his trips to the Middle East before the Madrid Peace

Conference in 1991. But he proved his doubters wrong, and American diplomacy worked. The landscape today is in many ways much less promising, but as Secretary Kerry knows as well as anyone, that is not an argument against trying, given all that is at stake.

Final Note

I'll close with a simple thought.

I'm not naïve about the Middle East or how little we really know about where this period of profound change will take the region and its people. The story that is unfolding is also very much a story of Arab peoples taking their own destiny in their own hands, which should provide a cautionary note about the degree to which we can help shape their futures. The Middle East can be very unforgiving for American policymakers and diplomats, and it would be foolish to assume the best.

We've had our share of recent tragedies, including the death of my friend, Chris Stevens, our Ambassador in Libya, who was killed trying to help Libyans realize the promise of their revolution, and not let it be hijacked by extremists. But we cannot afford to pull back from the region, whether because of security risks or rebalanced priorities or policy fatigue or domestic preoccupations. There's too much at issue right now, and we can increase the odds that moderates across the region can succeed over the next decade or two if we engage actively and creatively on behalf of democratic change, economic opportunity, and regional peace and security.

We will not get every judgment right, or take every risk that we should, but we are far better off working persistently to help shape events, rather than wait for them to be shaped for us.

Thank you very much.

5. DOD Officials Continue to Study Options in Syria (05-03-2013)

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 3, 2013 – Pentagon officials followed up today on Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel's statement yesterday that the United States is looking at arming the Syrian opposition, saying it is important to refine options as the situation on the ground changes.

In a meeting with reporters, Pentagon Press Secretary George Little stressed that the situation in Syria is extremely complicated, noting that the opposition contains jihadists as well as a great number of moderate elements.

"This administration has been focused squarely on Syria for a long time," he said. The U.S. government has been using diplomatic and economic levers to try and get Syrian president Bashar Assad to step down, and Pentagon and U.S. Central Command officials have been updating military options in case President Barack Obama needs them.

Military options are part of the puzzle that is Syria, but only part, Little said. The U.S. engagement in humanitarian operations in the nation, the diplomatic outreach to other nations in the region and economic sanctions against the government telegraph U.S. views of the conflict.

Those views are clear, Little said. "Assad must go," he added. "We hope that the Syrian people can determine their own future and that there is a responsible transition to a new Syria."

The United States and allies also must also think of post-Assad Syria, Little said, noting that once Assad leaves power, American and international partners have to do what is best in a very unstable part of the world.

The U.S. military is supporting the State Department in the humanitarian assistance mission to the people of Syria. U.S. military transport planes delivered packaged meals to countries bordering Syria for delivery to those in need inside the country. Other nonlethal aid being delivered to the opposition includes body armor and night-vision goggles.

"We're all clear-eyed about the challenges in this crisis, and it may not end overnight," Little said. "But if we can push this to a place where the violence is drawn down, there is an exit for Assad and there is a way to drive a political solution for the Syrian people themselves, that would be ideal."

[DOD Continues to Refine Options for President on Syria](#) (05-01-2013)

6. U.S., Britain Look to Strengthen Already Strong Alliance (05-02-2013)

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 2, 2013 – The United States and the United Kingdom are looking for ways to deepen an already close military-to-military relationship, American and British defense leaders said following a Pentagon meeting today.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and British Defense Secretary Philip Hammond told Pentagon reporters that they discussed the situations in Syria, Iran and Afghanistan.

The two men also discussed shared acquisition programs and ways to operate in fiscally constrained times.

With respect to Syria, the U.S. military continues to examine all options, including arming those opposed to the regime of Bashar Assad. "That's an option," Hagel said.

The international community's objective in Syria is to stop the violence, promote stability and help the Syrian people transition to a post-Assad government, Hagel noted.

"Any country, any power, any international coalition, any partnership is going to continue to look at options, how best to accomplish those objectives," he said. "This is not a static situation."

U.S. officials constantly are evaluating the fast-changing situation in Syria and one of those options -- among many -- is arming the rebels, Hagel said.

The two men agreed that a diplomatic solution in Syria is preferred.

"We continue to believe that a diplomatic solution is needed to end the bloodshed and that Assad and his close associates can have no place in the future of Syria," Hammond said. "We in the U.K.

are stepping up our support to the national coalition and remind the regime that nothing has been taken off the table in the light of the continuing bloodshed.”

There is some evidence that someone in Syria used a nerve agent, and both men said they are concerned about this.

“We remain increasingly concerned at the emerging evidence of the use of chemical weapons, and we demand that the regime allow the U.N. to investigate these allegations,” Hammond said. “Assad should be in no doubt that the world is watching and will hold him ... and anyone else to account who is found responsible for the use of chemical weapons.”

Hagel voiced his sympathy to the British people for the loss of three soldiers in Afghanistan’s Helmand province yesterday. He and Hammond discussed the ways the United States and the United Kingdom will work together through the end of the combat mission in Afghanistan in December 2014 and the way the two countries will support Afghanistan after that.

Hammond got a chance yesterday to see a British pilot flying the F-35B joint strike fighter being tested at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, Md.

“The United Kingdom’s continued commitment to this program, and our growing cooperation in new priority areas like cyber, is helping ensure this alliance has the kind of cutting-edge capabilities needed for the future,” Hagel said.

“The U.K. and the U.S. remain in lock step on these projects, and as we take them forward, we will ensure the continuity of those vital capabilities,” Hammond said.

The two men will continue discussions here tonight and will meet at NATO next month.

Biographies:

[Chuck Hagel](#)

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7. DOD Report: North Korea Still Critical U.S. Security Threat (05-02-2013)

By Cheryl Pellerin

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, May 2, 2013 – North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear capabilities and development of long-range ballistic missile programs make it one of the most critical U.S. security challenges in Northeast Asia, according to the Defense Department’s first report to Congress on that nation’s military development.

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel delivered the report, titled, “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2012,” to Congress today.

Required to be produced annually in classified and unclassified versions by Section 1236 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2012, the report is DOD’s authoritative

statement on North Korea's current and future military power, Pentagon officials said. It was developed by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The Korean People's Army -- an umbrella organization composed of ground, air, naval, missile and special operations forces -- ranks in personnel numbers as the fourth-largest military in the world. The large, forward-deployed military can inflict great damage on South Korea despite serious resource shortfalls and aging hardware, the report said, but the strength of the U.S.-South Korean alliance deters North Korea from conducting attacks on its southern neighbor.

On a smaller scale, North Korea has used military provocation to achieve national goals, the report notes. In 2010, for example, it sank the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, killing 46 South Korean sailors, and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, killing two South Korean marines and two civilians.

North Korea's continued pursuit of nuclear technology and capabilities and its development of long-range ballistic missile programs -- including the December 2012 Taepodong-2 missile launch and the April 2012 display of a new road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile -- demonstrate North Korea's threat to regional stability and U.S. national security, the report observed.

These programs, North Korea's hostility toward South Korea, and the proliferation of items prohibited under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2087 make North Korea a continued security challenge for the United States and its allies and partners, the report said.

The report assesses the following aspects of North Korean military power:

- The security situation on the Korean Peninsula, goals and factors shaping North Korean security strategy, and military strategy;
- Trends in North Korean security;
- North Korea's regional security objectives, including North Korean military capabilities, developments in North Korean military doctrine, and training;
- North Korea's proliferation activities; and
- Other military security developments.

North Korea's strategy under Kim Jong Il, who was supreme leader from 1994 until his death in 2011, focused on internal security, coercive diplomacy to compel acceptance of its diplomatic, economic and security interests, development of strategic military capabilities to deter external attack, and challenging South Korea and the U.S.-South Korean alliance, the report said.

"We anticipate these strategic goals will be consistent under North Korea's new leader, Kim Jong Un," the report added.

On the topic of cyber capabilities, the report said North Korea probably has a military computer network operations capability. North Korea may view computer network operations as an appealing platform from which to collect intelligence, the report added, and the nation has been implicated since 2009 in cyberattacks ranging from computer network exploitation to distributed denial of service attacks.

In assessing North Korea's security situation, the report said, "North Korea continues to fall behind the rising power of its regional neighbors, creating a widening military disparity and fueling its commitment to improving asymmetric and strategic deterrent capabilities as the primary guarantor of regime survival."

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have grown as relations between North and South Korea worsen, the report noted. North Korea has portrayed South Korea and the United States as constant threats to North Korea's sovereignty in a probable attempt to legitimize the Kim family rule, its draconian internal control mechanisms and existing strategies, the report said.

"The regime's greatest security concern is opposition from within," the report added, "and outside forces taking advantage of internal instability to topple the regime and achieve unification of the Korean Peninsula."

North Korea seeks recognition as an equal and legitimate international player and recognized nuclear power and seeks to normalize its diplomatic relations with the Western world and pursue economic recovery and prosperity, the report said.

"North Korea's rhetoric suggests the regime at this time is unlikely to pursue this second goal at the expense of the primary goal of pursuing its nuclear and missile capabilities," the report added.

North Korea is attempting to upgrade its conventional weapons by reinforcing long-range artillery forces near the Demilitarized Zone that separates North Korea and South Korea, the report said, and has a substantial number of mobile ballistic missiles that could strike targets in South Korea and Japan.

"These advances in ballistic missile delivery systems, coupled with developments in nuclear technology, are in line with North Korea's stated objectives to strike the U.S. homeland," the report said.

Weapon sales are a critical source of foreign currency for North Korea, the report said, and it is unlikely to cease export activities.

North Korea also continues to invest in nuclear infrastructure. It conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 and could conduct more tests at any time, the report said, violating its obligations under four U.N. Security Council resolutions and the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks.

Global concern about North Korea's proliferation activity continues to mount, leading some nations to take action. In June 2011, for example, a vessel bound for Burma, suspected of carrying military-related cargo, returned to North Korea after refusing a U.S. Navy inspection request.

In February 2010, South Africa seized North Korean-origin spare tank parts destined for the Republic of Congo. In December 2009, Thai authorities impounded the cargo of a chartered plane containing about 35 metric tons of North Korean weapons including artillery rockets, rocket-propelled grenades and surface-to-air missiles. In October of that year, South Korea seized North Korean-origin chemical-warfare protective suits destined for Syria.

“The United States remains vigilant in the face of North Korea’s continued provocations and steadfast in commitments to allies in the region, including the security provided by extended deterrence commitments through the nuclear umbrella and conventional forces,” the report said.

Related Sites:

[Report on North Korea’s Military and Security Developments](#) (PDF 624 KB)

8. [State's Rose on U.S. Missile Defense Efforts \(05-01-2013\)](#)

Remarks by Frank A. Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, Bucharest, Romania

3AF 9th Annual International Conference on Missile Defense

Thank you so much for inviting me to join you today. At the State Department, I am responsible for overseeing a wide range of defense policy issues, including missile defense policy. In this capacity, it was my responsibility and privilege to negotiate the details of the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) agreements with Poland, Romania, and Turkey that will enable the United States to implement the European Phased Adaptive Approach (or EPAA), the U.S. contribution to NATO missile defense. I spent a great deal of time here in Bucharest during the BMD agreement negotiations. It is always a pleasure for me to come to this fine city and to work with our great NATO Ally, Romania.

Over the next few minutes, I would like to give you a quick overview of the status of the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, or for short the E-P-A-A. I will touch on the extensive missile defense cooperation within NATO. I will say a few words about our efforts to cooperate with the Russian Federation on missile defense. Then I’ll close with a few remarks on the cooperation going on right here in Romania.

Implementation of the European Phased Adaptive Approach

Since 2009, the United States Government has focused on carrying out the vision articulated by President Obama when he announced that the EPAA would “provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American forces and America's Allies,” while relying on “capabilities that are proven and cost-effective.”

As you know, we have made great progress in implementing the President’s vision in Europe.

EPAA Phase One gained its first operational elements in 2011 with the start of a sustained deployment of an Aegis BMD-capable multi-role ship to the Mediterranean and the deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. With the declaration of Interim Operational Capability at the NATO Summit in Chicago, this radar transitioned to NATO operational control.

Demonstrating their support for both NATO and the EPAA, Spain agreed in 2011 to host four U.S. Aegis-capable ships at the existing naval facility at Rota. These ships will arrive in the 2014- 2015 timeframe, in time for EPAA Phase Two.

For Phase Two of the EPAA, we have an agreement that was ratified by Romania in December of 2011 to host a U.S. land-based SM-3 interceptor site, which will be deployed in the 2015 timeframe. This site, located at Deveselu Air Base, will feature the SM-3 Block IB interceptor, and

combined with BMD-capable ships in the Mediterranean, will enhance coverage of NATO from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.

And finally there is Phase 3, where we have an agreement with Poland that entered into force in September 2011. This agreement places a land-based interceptor site in Poland, just like the land-based site that will be deployed in Phase 2 here in Romania. Phase 3 also includes the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor. This Phase 3 missile defense site in Poland will be deployed in the 2018 timeframe.

The EPAA Phase 2 and Phase 3 sites are on schedule and on budget for deployment in the 2015 and 2018 timeframes, respectively.

On March 15, Secretary Hagel announced changes to U.S. missile defense policy to strengthen U.S. homeland missile defenses due to the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran and North Korea. One of these policy changes is that the SM-3 IIB missile defense interceptor program - the core element of EPAA Phase 4 - is being restructured into an interceptor kill vehicle technology development program.

With the SM-3 IIB interceptor, Phase 4 would have provided an intercept capability against ICBMs launched at the U.S. homeland from the Middle East. But the SM-3 IIB program experienced significant delays, in part due to the U.S. Congress underfunding the interceptor. So as you know, the SM-3 IIB interceptor will no longer be developed or procured.

I know that some may claim that not fielding Phase 4 may somehow weaken the Transatlantic connection of the EPAA. I would tell you that the connection is still strong. I would emphasize that Phases One through Three of the EPAA will continue to provide important contributions to the defense of the United States homeland and to the defense of U.S. deployed forces in Europe. For example, the radar deployed in Turkey as part of EPAA can provide important early tracking data on any Iranian missile launches against the United States. The interceptor sites to be deployed in Europe will also contribute to protecting the U.S. radar at Fylingdales, which is important to the defense of the U.S. homeland.

Let me also emphasize that the U.S. commitment to Phases One through Three of the EPAA and NATO missile defense remains ironclad, including the planned sites in Poland and Romania. Like the Administration, the U.S. Congress has supported, and continues to support full funding for Phases 1 through 3.

These U.S. missile defense deployments to Europe will be capable of providing ballistic missile defense coverage to all NATO European territory in the 2018 timeframe.

But instead of utilizing the SM-3 IIB interceptor, the United States will strengthen its homeland defense by procuring additional Ground Based Interceptors – GBIs – for deployment at our existing missile defense site in Fort Greely, Alaska.

As Secretary Hagel announced, we will increase the number of deployed GBIs from the current 30 to 44, providing a nearly 50 percent increase in our capability.

The other three steps that Secretary Hagel announced include:

- Deploying, with the support of the Japanese government, an additional AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan. This will provide improved early warning and tracking of any missile launched from North Korea at the United States and/or Japan;

- Conducting studies for a potential additional GBI site in the United States. While the Obama Administration has not made any decision on whether to proceed with an additional site, conducting these studies would shorten the timeline for construction should that decision be made; and
- As I mentioned previously, we are restructuring the SM-3 IIB missile defense interceptor program into a technology development program focused on improving the kill vehicles for our interceptors.

Cooperation with NATO Allies

Beyond our bilateral cooperation, we have also worked with our NATO Allies, including Romania, to implement a NATO missile defense effort.

After thorough and steady progress within NATO, on May 20-21 of 2012, the NATO Heads of State and Government met in Chicago for a NATO Summit and announced that NATO had achieved an interim BMD capability. This means that the Alliance has an operationally meaningful, standing peacetime BMD capability. NATO also agreed on the BMD-related command and control procedures, designated the Supreme Allied Commander Europe as the commander for this mission, and announced an interoperable command and control capability.

To support this interim BMD capability, the United States has offered EPAA assets to the Alliance as our voluntary national contributions to the BMD mission. The AN/TPY-2 radar deployed in Turkey is under NATO operational control. In addition, U.S. BMD-capable Aegis ships in Europe are also now able to operate under NATO operational control when threat conditions warrant.

These decisions have created a framework for Allies to contribute and optimize their own BMD assets for our collective self-defense, and the United States welcomes and encourages such contributions from Allies. NATO BMD will be more effective should Allies provide sensors and interceptors to complement the U.S. EPAA contributions. Several NATO Allies already possess land- and sea-based sensors that could potentially be linked into the system, as well as lower tier systems that can be integrated and used to provide point defense such as PATRIOT. If Allies should decide to develop their own BMD capabilities, that could create significant opportunities for European industries, science, and technology. In short, there is absolutely no requirement or assumption that NATO missile defense will be “made in the USA.” The only requirement is that the systems contributed by Allies be interoperable with NATO’s Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense – or ALTBMD – command and control capability.

Cooperation with the Russian Federation

At the same time as we are developing this missile defense cooperation with NATO, we also seek to work cooperatively with Russia. We remain convinced that missile defense cooperation between the United States and Russia (and between NATO and Russia) is in the national security interests of all countries involved. For that reason, missile defense cooperation with Russia remains a Presidential priority for this Administration.

In Chicago, the NATO Allies made a very clear statement of our intent regarding strategic stability and Russia’s strategic deterrent. NATO declared in the Chicago Summit Declaration that “...the NATO missile defense in Europe will not undermine strategic stability. NATO missile defense is not directed against Russia and will not undermine Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities.”

Through transparency and cooperation with the United States and NATO, Russia would see firsthand that this system is designed for ballistic missile threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area, and that NATO missile defense systems can neither negate nor undermine Russia's strategic deterrent capabilities.

While we seek to develop ways to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, it is important to remember that just as Russia must ensure the defense of Russian territory, NATO must ensure the defense of NATO territory. NATO cannot and will not outsource its Article 5 commitments. As ballistic missile threats continue to evolve, we cannot place limits or constraints on our ability to defend ourselves and our allies.

Cooperation with Romania

Let me finish up my remarks by saying a few words about our cooperation here in Romania.

Romania is an important ally and partner of the United States, and we are committed to a relationship based on our shared values, including a commitment to democracy.

As allies in NATO and through other international organizations, Romania and the United States work on many of our shared global challenges, from halting nuclear proliferation and increasing energy security to combating climate change. We appreciate the key role Romania played in NATO as we worked to develop the new Strategic Concept on issues such as missile defense and internal reform of the Alliance. The United States looks forward to broadening and deepening our bilateral partnership with Romania as we continue strengthening our Euro-Atlantic ties.

In February 2010, the President of the United States selected Romania to host the EPAA Phase 2 interceptor site. Romania accepted the offer and the rest is history -- the Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement was ratified by Romania in December 2011.

Since that time, there has been a great deal of activity here in Romania, largely led by U.S. European Command, to conclude the lower-level details necessary to begin work on the new missile defense site at the Romanian Deveselu Air Base.

I commend my Romanian colleagues for their leadership within NATO. Romania is also a participant in the U.S. Strategic Command's NIMBLE TITAN multinational missile defense campaign. At NIMBLE TITAN events, the Romanian military, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials are working closely with over 20 countries and NATO to collaboratively think through how regional and global coalitions might be able to innovate with equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures to provide the best and most agile defense. In a world where the threats and the technology to defend are constantly evolving, it is our responsibility to think through the problems to reach the best and most efficient solutions.

Conclusions

We are proud of how much we have already achieved by working with our allies and partners to counter the threat from ballistic missiles, but admittedly, there is still much to do -- and we are looking forward to achieving higher levels of BMD cooperation and effectiveness.

I am very pleased to be here today, and I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

9. Arab League, U.S. Officials Reaffirm Peace Initiative (04-30-2013)

By Merle David Kellerhals Jr.
Staff Writer

Washington — Vice President Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry met with senior Arab League officials to discuss the 10-year-old Arab Peace Initiative's role in helping to resolve the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict.

“During the course of those discussions, on behalf of the president of the United States, I underscored the Arab League's very important role that it is playing and has determined to play in bringing about a peace to the Middle East and specifically by reaffirming the Arab Peace Initiative ... with a view to ending the conflict,” Kerry said at an April 29 press conference following their meeting.

Biden and Kerry met with Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr Al Thani, chairman of the Arab Peace Initiative follow-up committee; Arab League Secretary-General Nabil Elaraby; and senior officials from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Saudi Arabia at Blair House, across from the White House.

The Arab Peace Initiative was proposed as a comprehensive plan at the 2002 Beirut Summit of the Arab League by the then crown prince, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. It was re-endorsed at the 2007 Riyadh Arab League Summit.

The initiative calls for the following:

- An end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- The 22-member Arab League to provide full normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for Israel's withdrawal to its June 4, 1967, borders, including East Jerusalem.
- A “just settlement” of the Palestinian refugee crisis based on U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194, which ended the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and which resolves that any refugees desiring to return to their homes and living in peace be able to do so or be offered compensation.

At the Blair House conference, Prime Minister Hamad told journalists that the league reaffirmed its peace initiative based on a two-state solution. Hamad also said that they agreed to a modification to the peace initiative which allows for a “comparable and mutual agreed minor swap of the land” between the Israelis and Palestinians recognizing the reality of burgeoning communities that have grown up in the years since.

Kerry told journalists after the meeting: “We've had a very positive, very constructive discussion in the course of the afternoon with positive results.”

President Obama had outlined in May 2011 his vision of Middle East peace with the two states — Israel and a Palestinian state — living side by side in peace and security brought about through direct negotiations between the two parties. Obama also stressed that the 1967 borders were part of the basis for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

The Arab Peace Initiative has the support of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority.

Kerry said that U.S. officials and the Arab League delegation “agreed that peace between Israelis and Palestinians would advance security, prosperity and stability in the Middle East.” They also agreed to continue with the peace consultations.
